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Employer Solicitation Policies: Unions Versus Charity
Michael J. Borree*
I. INTRODUCTION
The organization of workers for the purpose of collectively address-
ing issues of labor conditions, such as wages, with employers has long
been hailed as a protection against employer abuses in setting such
conditions. This is reflected in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),I the establishment of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) as the enforcer of the Act,2 as well as in the rise of the mod-
ern union. Section 7 of the NLRA allows employees the right to or-
ganize, form, join, or assist a labor organization.3 In addition, this
section extends to employees the right to bargain collectively with the
employer. 4 The enforcement of such rights is reflected in § 8(a)(1) of
the Act, which provides: "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."5
An obvious precursor of the realization of the rights provided in § 7
would seem to be the ability of a union to gain access to employees for
the purpose of organizing. The 1992 Supreme Court decision in Lech-
mere, Inc. v. NLRB 6 may have placed a restriction on this ability. The
Court in Lechmere held that an employer does not need to extend
union, nonemployee, organizers a right of access to their property, un-
less other means of access do not exist or the employer discriminates
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D., expected May 2003; University of Wisconsin-
Madison, B.A., 1999.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1988). It is important to note that the NLRA only applies to private
sector employees. This article's analysis is confined to private sector employees as compared to
public sector. The act does not cover individuals employed in the railroad and airline industries.
The purpose of the Act is to protect employees against employer abuses of bargaining power.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988). The Board was actually created by Amendment to the National
Management Relations Act in 1947.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .... Id.
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
6. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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against the uninon.7 The Court found that nonemployees are not enti-
tled to access for the purpose of organizing because § 7 "confers rights
on only employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers." 8
Lechmere may represent a crossroads for both unions and employ-
ers in the legal system's struggle to define the outer limits of an em-
ployee's rights to fulfill the promises of § 7. It may also represent an
acknowledgment from the Supreme Court that an employer should be
granted certain rights to use its property as it see fits. As such, em-
ployers often allow access to groups soliciting information or contribu-
tions.9 To what extent does an employer's issuance of access to these
groups discriminate against union requests for access? As far back as
1949 the Supreme Court espoused the position that employers may
not discriminate against unions in such a manner. In NLRB v. Stowe
Spinning Co., the Court found that the NLRB may find a violation of
§ 8(a)(1) where an employer denies a union access to company prop-
erty while allowing other outside groups such access. 10 According to
Stowe, giving access to non-union groups while excluding unions
amounts to discrimination and is a violation of the NLRA.1t
As a result of Lechmere, the labor movement was forced to reevalu-
ate union organizing tactics. As a result, many of the unions insti-
tuted, or reinstituted, a practice termed "salting."' 2 The practice
occurs when a company employs a paid union organizer or sympa-
thizer for the purposes of educating the workforce about the orga-
nizer's union and eventually conducting an organizational campaign. 13
Once the union organizer becomes employed, he may exercise § 7
rights. An employer may not, as a result, discharge the employee, nor
refuse to hire a prospective employee based on the applicant's union
7. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537.
8. Id at 532.
9. Such contributions may include, but are not limited to groups such as the Red Cross, the
United Way or the Girl Scouts of America.
10. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949). An employer may not discriminate
against a labor organization by denying use of a company-owned hall while allowing other non-
union groups to use the hall.
11. Id.
12. Victor J. Van Bourg & Ellyn Moscowitz, Salting the Mines: The Legal and Political Impli-
cations of Placing Paid Union Organizers in the Employer's Workplace, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1, 1 (1998).
13. Id. at 5.
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affiliation. 14 As a result of the ruling in Lechmere, unions have at-
tempted to expand the practice of "salting".
15
The Federal Appeals Courts have handed down a number of deci-
sions since Lechmere that address discrimination of union activity by
employers. 16 However, it does not appear that any of the cases de-
cided since Lechmere give a clear definition as to what constitutes dis-
crimination of union activity. In fact, it would appear that the
decisions of the courts in these cases have actually complicated the
issue. As well, the Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari in a case
involving a claim of discrimination by a union.17 Thus, employers are
without a clarification of what non-union activities, if any, they may
permit on its premises so as to avoid a claim of discrimination by a
union whose organizers have been barred from the property.
This article will argue that it is crucial for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in a case that addresses a claim of discrimination (and
a violation of the NLRA) by a union that has been excluded from an
employer's premises while other groups have been granted access for
their activities. The cases that the Federal Appeals Courts have de-
cided in this area involve a number of issues. First, Lechmere obvi-
ously placed a stranglehold on a union's attempt to organize
employees through nonemployee organizers. Yet, one may also argue
that other channels of access to employees exist so as to lighten the
blow of Lechmere. In addition, the question must be asked regarding
the role the union tactic of salting has played in easing the impact of
Lechmere. Commentators have argued that the practice of salting has
to some extent negated the effect Lechmere had on union organizing
efforts.18
This issue also has implications for the property rights of employers
and their ability to carry on operations without distraction from activi-
ties and groups that may have a negative impact on business. Should
we allow employers to make decisions as to what kinds of activities
may be allowed on their premises based on what is least damaging to
the interests of business?
14. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995). A worker may be both
covered by the NLRA as an employee of the company as he or she is simultaneously a paid
union organizer. Thus, once the employee becomes part of the workforce, he or she may solicit
union information to the employees.
15. Van Bourg & Moscowitz, supra note 12, at 4.
16. See Sandusky Mall Co. v. NLRB, 242 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2001); Four B Corp. v. NLRB, 163
F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1998); Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996).
17. The Supreme Court has not revisited the issue presented in Lechmere.
18. Van Bourg & Moscowitz, supra note 12, at 4.
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This article will argue that the Supreme Court must narrow its ex-
ception for discrimination first enunciated in NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co.' 9 and Lechmere. The Supreme Court must find the prohi-
bition of discrimination, in this context, to mean that employers may
not discriminate among unions.20 The NLRB and courts should not
find violations of the NLRA to occur when an employer allows chari-
table groups to solicit while excluding union organizers. These argu-
ments are based on several points. First, the increased ability of
nonemployee union organizers to gain access to employees away from
company premises decreases the need to have access to the em-
ployer's property. Likewise, the perceived expansion of salting has
taken some of the sting out of Lechmere's effects on unions. Third,
the protection of an employer's property right to exclude others based
on state law is persuasive, as well.
The present state of the law in this area often makes a distinction
between union organizational activities and union activities involving
"handbilling" 21 or protesting. Union organizational activities are
often given a greater degree of protection under the NLRA than ac-
tivities involving union protests of employer activities on employer
property.22 This article will also argue that it is wise to uphold such a
distinction.
In Part II (Background) of this article, the procedural course of la-
bor grievances will first be outlined. This section will also discuss the
rights of employers to exclude under the ambit of core property rights
and state trespass laws. Next, the activities of unions in organizing
and protesting will be discussed in the context of nonemployee access.
Part II will give a history of the conflict existing between the NLRB
and the Courts regarding what constitutes discrimination. In addition
to the conflict existing between the Board and the courts, several Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals have issued decisions that bear conflicting
tones. These conflicts will be addressed.
19. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). See supra note 2. The discrimina-
tion exception stated that an employer may only prohibit nonemployee union organizational
activities if the employer does not discriminate by allowing other forms of activity.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). Employers are not allowed to allow one union on their
premises while excluding another, rival union. Such an action would not only constitute blatant
discrimination but it would also be a violation of § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA which prohibits an
employer from giving support to a union: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contrib-
ute financial or other support to it..." Id.
21. "Handbilling" is the term that refers to the union practice of passing out flyers containing
information intended to dissuade the public from patronizing a company that has acted ad-
versely to the union's interests.
22. See Sandusky Mal, 242 F.3d at 692.
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Part III will investigate the current state of union activity. Unions
argue that Lechmere represents a severe impediment to the realiza-
tion of employees' right to organize. Unions state that there is a cor-
relation between the Court's holding in Lechmere and statistics
reflecting declines in organization.
Part III will next provide some clarity to the jumbled state of prece-
dent following Lechmere. This section will first give a summary of
what broad guidelines may be drawn from existing law. Next, this ar-
ticle will attempt to discern what the Supreme Court truly meant by
the word "discriminate" in Lechmere. And finally, justifications will
be made for a narrowed tailoring of the word "discriminate".
II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the current state of the law in this area, it is first
necessary to highlight the procedural route labor conflicts take
through their ruling bodies. Next, it is necessary to look at the impact
property rights and the trespass laws have on the exclusion of unions
from an employer's premises. The remainder of the Background will
focus on the current conflicts present in the NLRB's and the various
circuit courts' readings of the Supreme Court's holding in Lechmere.
A. Procedural Differences
To better understand the history of law in this area, it is first neces-
sary to explain the procedure for addressing grievances under the
NLRA. When a union, an employee, or an employer files a grievance
alleging a violation of the NLRA, an unfair labor practice ("ULP") is
filed. Upon filing this charge, an administrative law judge ("ALJ")
will grant a hearing to address the charge. Administrative law judges
are situated throughout the country at district locales that the NLRB
maintains. After conducting the hearing, the ALJ will make a ruling
(either in favor of the union or the employer). Following this ruling,
the parties have the option of appealing the ALJ's order to the
NLRB. If this option is exercised the Board, comprised of five mem-
bers, will then hear the case in full.23 Or alternatively, the five-mem-
ber board may delegate this authority to a panel of three members. 24
Following its order, the parties have the option of appealing to the
appropriately situated Federal Appeals Court. The party that is ap-
pealing the Board's order is able to choose this court. This court may
23. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL, LABOR LAW 107 (2000).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). "The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise." Id.
2003]
454 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
either be the Court situated where the violation took place, where the
petitioner does business, or in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.2 5 Finally, the Supreme Court may grant certiorari if it be-
lieves that the filing petitioner was aggrieved by the Appeals Court's
decision.2 6
B. The Right To Exclude
The right of property owners to exclude others from their property
is often characterized as the most fundamental right of the three core
property rights.27 Thus, a threshold issue in determining whether an
employer has violated § 8(a)(1) is whether it had a right to exclude in
the first place. Was the property actually owned by the employer,
vesting him with the right to exclude?2 8 Often, parties to a dispute
over such an exclusion will argue over whether the employer had such
a right in the first place. For instance, where an employer has ex-
cluded union protesters from a sidewalk adjacent to the property, the
union may argue that the protesters were lawfully there since the em-
ployer had no property interest in the sidewalk. 29 For purposes of this
article, it will be assumed that the employer holds a valid property
right to exclude others.
The exercise of the property right to exclude falls under the ambit
of state trespass law.30 However, under the NLRA the union clearly
has the right to engage in such activities so as to realize its § 7 rights.
Suppose an employer attempts to bar a union from engaging in pro-
test activities on its property based on state trespass law. Employees
have the right to engage in concerted activity under the NLRA.31
Thus, a conflict exists. Even though an employer may eject persons
from its property based on state trespass law, employees (under the
NLRA) have a federal right to engage in economic protest activities.
The question that arises at this point is whether the NLRA preempts
state jurisdiction over a trespass claim?
25. ARCHIBALD Cox, supra note 23, at 108.
26. id.
27. ED3WARD RA3IN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 1 (2000). The
other two core property rights being the right to possess property and the right to dispose of, or
alienate, the property.
28. See Calkins (Indio Grocery Outlet), 323 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1141 (1997). See also Local 400 v.
N.L.R.B. (Farm Fresh Acquisition, Inc.), 222 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The right of
employers to exclude union organizers emanates from state property E.w.
29. Farm Fresh Acquisition, Inc., 222 F.3d at 1033.
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 181 (1978).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
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In Sears, Roebuck & Company v. San Diego District Council of
Carpenters,32 the Supreme Court addressed this issue. A carpenter's
union established a picket line on Sears' property after determining
that certain work in the employer's store was not being performed by
workers from the union's hiring hall as agreed upon. Sears obtained
an injunction barring the union's trespass.33 The California Supreme
Court determined that its lower state courts did not have jurisdiction
to issue an injunction because the employees' right to engage in pro-
test activities was protected under Federal law.34 The Supreme Court
reversed the California decision.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that so long as the employer is only
challenging the legality of the protester's location, not the legality of
the protest itself, state jurisdiction to hear the trespass claim is not
pre-empted.
Sears only challenged the location of the picketing; whether the
picketing had an objective proscribed by federal law was irrelevant
to the state claim. Accordingly, permitting the state court to adjudi-
cate Sears' trespass claim would create no realistic risk of interfer-
ence with the Labor Board's primary jurisdiction to enforce the
statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.35
Thus, an employer's action of ejecting protesters from its property
falls under state law where the employer is not challenging the legality
of the protest itself.
The NLRA does not limit the places in which an employee's § 7
rights may be exercised. 36 Employees would seem to be able to en-
gage in organizational and protest activities on their employer's prop-
erty. However, Sears Roebuck raises severe doubts as to this ability.
Even if an individual may engage in union activities on company
premises, as the next section illustrates, this right is confined only to
those persons termed "employees". 37
C. The Three Core Rights Of Employers... And
Only "Employees"!
The NLRA extends three core rights to employees: (1) to organize;
(2) to bargain collectively with the employer over wages and other
terms and conditions of employment; and (3) to engage in "concerted
32. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
33. Id. at 182-83.
34. Id. at 180.
35. Id. at 198.
36. See supra note 3. Notice that the statutory language of § 7 does not place restrictions on
the locations where these rights may be exercised.
37. See infra Part II.C.
2003]
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activity". 38 Although § 7 of the Act extends these rights, they are not
implemented until later sections.39 The language of the NLRA only
extends these rights to "employees". The language of § 7 does not
extend these rights to unions. Although some commentators would
argue that § 7 should be read to extend protection to union employ-
ees, the holding in Lechmere indicates § 7 does not extend such rights
to employees of a union.40 Rather, "employees" is interpreted to
mean those persons under the employ of the business. 4'
This proposition is exemplified by drawing a distinction between
the court's holdings in Republic Aviation v. NLRB 42 and Lechmere.
Republic Aviation held that it was a violation of § 8(a)(1) for an em-
ployer to ban employee organizing activities in the workplace where
such activities occur during an employee's own time.43 Lechmere, on
the other hand, provides that it is not a violation for an employer to
ban activities of non-employees where the activities occur on an em-
ployer's premises since these are not activities by employees as de-
fined under the NLRA.44 Unions may argue that the NLRA should
be amended to include nonemployee organizers within the definition
of "employees". In light of the Court's holding in Lechmere, this is
unlikely.
In ITT Industries v. NLRB, 45 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia further clarified the grant of § 7 rights. In this case, em-
ployees situated at one manufacturing site engaged in protest activi-
ties at a second site owned by the same employer. The employer
attempted to bar the employees from the property. The employer be-
lieved he was accorded this right based on Lechmere.46 However, the
court ruled that the employees enjoy § 7 rights where they are em-
ployed by the same operation, no matter the location.47 It was imma-
terial that these employees were not actually employed for work at
38. See supra note 3.
39. Id. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to restrain employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights granted in § 7. Section 7 grants the three rights to employees.
Yet, without the threat of sanction imposed by § 8(a)(1), § 7 rights are essentially meaningless.
Section 8(a)(1) is the enforcement mechanism for employees aggrieved of their rights guaran-
teed under § 7.
40. See supra note 6.
41. Id.
42. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
43. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 796. Such 'own time' may be construed to mean lunch or
other break times.
44. Supra note 8.
45. 251 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
46. Id. at 1005.
47. Id. at 1004. 48 NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
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this specific site. Rather, because the employees worked for the same
employer, they could engage in activities at this site.
As stated, Stowe48 appears to be the first case addressing discrimi-
natory conduct by an employer in denying access to its property by a
union. However, Babcock seems to set the stage for the present con-
troversy. In Babcock the Supreme Court stated, "an employer may
validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union
literature. ' '49 The decision does carve an exception to this rule. An
employer may not post such bans where other channels of communi-
cation do not exist for a union to relay its message to employees. 50
Although this exception may give unions some solace, it appears that
the situations in which such channels cease to exist are rare.
Babcock's reference to the clash between the property rights of em-
ployers and the rights granted to employees under the NLRA has
great applicability to the present controversy:
Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority,
the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accom-
modation between the two must be obtained with as little destruc-
tion of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other. The
employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; the
union may not always insist that the employer aid organization. 51
Babcock seems to imply that a balancing must be rendered between
such rights in the same breath that it finds the employer may impede
organization. However, The Court never explicitly stated that such a
balance is necessary. Under Babcock, an employer may ban nonem-
ployee, union solicitation on its property.
Following Babcock, but pre-Lechmere, several unions claimed a
First Amendment right to distribute union materials on company
property. The Supreme Court rejected such notions. In Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner,52 the Court found that a union had no First Amendment
right to use privately owned property for distributing handbills and
other related activity where the employer had placed a general no-
solicitation ban.53 This decision seemed to clarify the approach to the
First Amendment claim in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB. 54 In Cen-
tral Hardware, the Supreme Court held that a non-employee could not
have a First Amendment claim upheld unless the employer's property
48. 336 U.S. 226.
49. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
50. Id. at 111.
51. Id.
52. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
53. Id. See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
54. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
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had "to some degree the functional attributes of public property de-
voted to public use."' 55 Thus, at this point, nonemployee union or-
ganizers were unable to find cover for organizational activities under
the First Amendment, nor the NLRA, except in circumstances where
alternative channels of communication did not exist or the employer's
rejection fit the exception for discrimination. 56
D. Jean Country
In Jean Country,57 the NLRB announced a new test that balanced
the organizational rights of § 7 against the property rights of the
employer:
In all access cases our essential concern will be (1) the degree of
impairment of the Section 7 right if access should be denied as it
balances against (2) the degree of impairment of the private prop-
erty right if access should be granted. We view the consideration of(3) the availability of reasonably effective alternative means as es-
pecially significant in this balancing process.58
This balancing test conflicts with the Court's holding in Babcock. The
Court in Babcock implied that a balancing of factors regarding access,
property rights, and § 7 rights, could be employed. However, it never
explicitly stated that such was necessary. Thus, the Supreme Court
may have felt a need to reexamine Babcock following Jean Country.
It did so in Lechmere.
E. Lechmere
In Lechmere, a union began a campaign to organize a retail store's
two hundred employees. The union took out a full-page advertise-
ment in a local newspaper seeking support for an organizational cam-
paign at the store. After the advertisement failed to garner significant
response, "nonemployee union organizers entered Lechmere's park-
ing lot and began placing handbills on the windshields of cars parked
in a corner of the lot used mostly by employees. '59 Following efforts
by Lechmere's management to bar the organizers from the parking
lot, the union attempted to contact the employees through the mail,
by telephone and even through home visits. When these efforts were
55. Id. at 547.
56. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
57. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988), abrogated by Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 58 Id
at 14.
58. 291 N.L.R.B. at 14.
59. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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unsuccessful in organizing support,60 the union filed an unfair labor
practice against Lechmere alleging that it had violated § 8(a)(1) by
preventing the nonemployee organizers from gaining access to its
property.61
The Administrative Law Judge, the NLRB and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the union based on Jean Country.
However, The Supreme Court ruled that the First Circuit's decision
should be overruled and that the order of the NLRB should be
denied.
In an opinion by Justice Thomas,62 the Court found that an em-
ployer cannot be compelled to allow nonemployee organizers onto its
property, under Babcock, unless "the inaccessibility of employees
makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to com-
municate with them through the usual channels. '63 The Court did not
find such circumstances to exist here. The Court went on to find that
a balancing of factors set out in Jean Country was inconsistent with its
holding in Babcock.64 In essence, the Court's decision in Lechmere
reaffirmed and invigorated its holding in Babcock while discarding the
balancing test favored by the NLRB in Jean Country.
The Court in Lechmere placed the burden of displaying a lack of
alternative means of communication on the union. The Court also
reaffirmed the discrimination exception of Babcock. It stated that if
the union was able to show discrimination on the part of the em-
ployer, this may also result in a violation of the NLRA: "to gain ac-
cess, the union has the burden of showing that no other reasonable
means of communicating its organizational message to the employees
exists or that the employer's access rules discriminate against union
solicitation. ' 65 Thus, Lechmere posits two ways by which nonem-
ployee union organizers may gain access to an employer's property in
the face of a ban on such access: (1) the union may either carry the
burden of showing that no alternative channels of communication ex-
60. The union was able to gain only one authorization card. In order for a union to be granted
the right to hold an election in which employees decide whether they desire union representa-
tion, the union first must receive authorization cards from one-third of the workforce demon-
strating their interest in being represented by the union.
61. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 529.
62. This was Justice Thomas' first written opinion as a Justice of the Supreme Court.
63. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 527-28 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112
(1956)).
64. Id. at 538. Jean Country significantly erodes "Babcock's general rule that an employer
may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of employee literature. We reaf-
firm that general rule today, and reject the Board's attempt to recast it as a multifactor balancing
test." Id.
65. Id. at 535 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978)).
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ist so as to effectively reach the employees; or, (2) it may show that
the employer's decision to allow other groups of nonemployees on its
property discriminates against the union. Although, neither path has
opened a floodgate for claims of nonemployee access, it is obvious
that unions have found more success in the discrimination context.
Lechmere cleared the air regarding the conflict between its holding
in Babcock and the Board's favored balancing test in Jean Country.
However, the Court in Lechmere did not examine or explain exactly
what constitutes discrimination. Whereas the Court provided in-
stances in which an employee's § 7 rights could be denied (and access
should be allowed by nonemployees) due to the lack of communica-
tion channels, it gave no such examples of instances in which discrimi-
nation violates these rights. 66 The Supreme Court has yet to provide
any such examples or guidance on the issue. Thus, debate among the
numerous Circuit Courts of Appeal as the circumstances under which
an employer discriminates has confused both unions and employers
alike. The current division between the NLRB and the courts, as well
as conflicts between the courts themselves provides impetus for the
need for guidance.
F. When Does An Employer Discriminate Against The Union?
1. Division between NLRB and the Courts
"It is unclear what outside groups an employer can allow on its
property while lawfully excluding nonemployee union representa-
tives."' 67 It can be generally said that the NLRB and the Courts disa-
gree on what amounts to discrimination. Courts generally distinguish
between an organizational activity and a protest activity.68 Courts
have tended to find discrimination and a violation of the Act where an
employer defers to one union over the other.69 The NLRB will likely
find the same. However, courts are, on average, less likely to find
discrimination where the union is engaged in protest activities.
66. Id. at 539-40. The court refers to prior holdings in citing examples where nonemployee
access should be available: logging camps (quoting NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167
F.2d 147 (1948)), mining camps (quoting Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972)), or moun-
tain resort hotels (quoting NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (1967)).
67. Deborah L. Stein, Keep Off the Grass: Prohibiting Nonemployee Union Access Without
Discriminating, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2039 (1998).
68. See supra note 22.
69. Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"Although the Court has never clarified the meaning of the term [discrimination], and we have
found no published court of appeals cases addressing the significance of 'discrimination' in this
context, we hold that the term 'discrimination' as used in Babcock means favoring one union
over another, or allowing employer-related information while barring similar union-related in-
formation."). See also supra note 20.
[Vol. 1:449
EMPLOYER SOLICITATION
The NLRB doesn't seem to make such a distinction. 70
2. Be-Lo Stores and Its Exceptions
In Be-Lo Stores,71 the NLRB carved out two exceptions in which it
would not find discrimination in an employer's act of allowing non-
union solicitations while enforcing a rule against union solicitations.
The Board stated that it would find no violation where employers al-
low "work-related activities" or "isolated beneficent acts" while ex-
cluding union activities. 72 Nonetheless, the NLRB found that
discrimination of a no-solicitation rule existed where members of a
Muslim group sold oils and incense, an "occasional" Jehovah's Wit-
ness distributed magazines, and solicitations by the Lion's Club were
"occasionally" allowed. 73
It is quite peculiar that it took the NLRB until 1995 to carve these
exceptions into its general stance on discrimination in light of its hold-
ing in Hammary.74 In Hammary, the Board allowed an employer to
enforce a no-solicitation policy on its premises against a union while
allowing the employer to make an exception to a United Way drive.
The Board placed a particular emphasis on the number of exceptions
the employer permitted.75 Thus, the "isolated beneficent acts" excep-
tion seems to imply that there is a certain threshold, which an em-
ployer must stay below in allowing for exceptions to a no solicitation
rule. It is not clear why this exception was not solidified until Be-Lo's
holding, which was thirteen years after Hammary.
G. Where The Courts Currently Stand
Courts have been very reluctant to adopt an approach like that of
the NLRB in quantifying the number of acts an employer may be per-
mitted to allow on its property before a finding of discrimination takes
place. Rather, courts have preferred to delineate between organiza-
tional activities and those activities in which a union is promoting a
70. See Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1997); Cleveland Real Estate Partners
v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996). Both cases are exemplary of the notion that the Board has
been likely to find a violation of the NLRA where an employer allows solicitation by other
groups and excludes the union's protest activities. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals seem
to lend little deference to these decisions and will often draw distinctions between union activi-
ties that are organizational in nature as opposed to those that are protests aimed at an employer.
71. 318 N.L.R.B. 1 (1995).
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. at 15.
74. 265 N.L.R.B. 57 (1982).
75. Id. Although the Court found that the employer had discriminated against the union in
allowing for employee raffles and certain collections, it nonetheless seemed to indicate that had
the United Way drive been the only exception, it would not have found a violation.
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certain cause relating to economics such as handbilling. 76 Nonethe-
less, some circuits have referred to the Board's finding in Be-Lo
Stores, finding violations of § 8(a)(1) where employers have denied
union organizers access. Consequently, much confusion has resulted.
1. Be-Lo Stores
Following the Board's finding that Be-Lo violated § 8(a)(1), the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the order.77 The Fourth
Circuit did not address whether the NLRB should engage in granting
exceptions for employer discrimination. In failing to address whether
such exceptions should be referred to, the court implied that no such
analysis was needed. An employer's act of prohibiting nonemployee
protests while allowing for non-union solicitations did not amount to
discrimination. The court illustrated an important point. The court
stated that the Supreme Court could not have intended the word "dis-
criminate" to mean that an employer commits a § 8(a)(1) violation by
allowing distribution of nonunion literature on its premises, while ex-
cluding union, nonemployee picketers.78 The court struck down the
Board's order partly on the basis that claims of access by nonemploy-
ees "are at their nadir when the nonemployees wish to engage in pro-
test or economic activities" as opposed to purely organizational
activities. 79 The Fourth Circuit drew a line in the sand: where access
is for the purpose of protest, a claim of discrimination by the employer
will not be heard in the same light as one in which the access is for the
purpose of organizing.
Be-Lo Stores exemplifies the conflict that exists between the NLRB
and the Courts. In reviewing the Administrative Law Judge's ruling
that the employer did indeed discriminate, the Board carved excep-
tions to Babcock and Lechmere so as to uphold the finding of discrimi-
nation. The Fourth Circuit took the opposite stance, refusing to
engage in analysis of whether an exception should be made.
2. Cleveland Real Estate Partners
In 1996 in Cleveland Real Estate Partners,80 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed a Board's finding of discrimination where a mall
76. See supra note 22.
77. Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1997).
78. Id. at 285. "To affirm the Board's contrary finding on this record would be tantamount to
a holding that if an employer ever allows the distribution of literature on any of its property,
then it must open its property to paid union picketers. We are confident that the Supreme Court
never intended such a result." Id.
79. Id. at 284 (quoting UFCW v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 292, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
80. Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996).
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manager barred union protests against one of the mall's stores, but the
mall allowed patrons to be solicited by charitable organizations. The
Court here seemed to narrow the scope of a claim of discrimination:
"To discriminate in the enforcement of a no solicitation policy cannot
mean that an employer commits an unfair labor practice if it allows
the Girl Scouts to sell cookies, but is shielded from the effect of the
Act if it prohibits them from doing so."81 Rather, the Court believes
that discrimination should be limited to instances where an employer
favors one union over another in that it allows one to solicit to the
exclusion of the other. 82
As well, the Court appeared to defer to public policy judgments in
noting "no relevant labor policies are advanced by requiring employ-
ers to prohibit charitable solicitations in order to preserve the right to
exclude nonemployee distribution of union literature. ' 83 This implies
that the Sixth Circuit is not merely confining its analysis of this issue
to precedent and interpretation of the NLRA alone. Rather, it is ex-
tending its analysis to encompass considerations of advancing the la-
bor movement's aims.
3. Riesbeck Food Markets
Also in 1996, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a
NLRB finding of discrimination in Riesbeck Food Markets, Inc. v.
NLRB.84 In a prelude to its decision in Be-Lo Stores, the Fourth Cir-
cuit indicated that it would protect an employer's right to channel the
messages communicated on its property: "an employer must have
some degree of control over the messages it conveys to its customers
on its private property."85
The court also made a distinction regarding the effects of certain
protests. The court found that Riesbeck's purpose of selling goods
would clearly be undermined by union protests urging customers not
to patronize the business. Whereas, charitable solicitations do not
pose such a threat to the business's purpose.8 6 The court went on to
state that such a distinction could be weakened if the employer al-
lowed political organizations to convey potentially controversial
messages. However, since there was no evidence of the employer
81. Id. at 465.
82. Id at 464-65.
83. Id. at 465.
84. Riesbeck Food Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 95-1766, 95-1917, 1996 WL 40524 (4th Cir.
1996).
85. Id. at *13.
86. Id. at *14.
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granting such permission, the employer did not treat the union ad-
versely.87 The court focused merely on the effects of the discrimina-
tion. Perhaps under such an analysis, even if an employer intended to
discriminate against a union, so long as the effects of the discrimina-
tion are not egregious, there is no violation of § 8(a)(1).
4. Lucile Salter Packard
In Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hospital v. NLRB, 88 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a NLRB determina-
tion of discrimination of a no-solicitation policy. Also decided in
1996, the court deferred to the exceptions enunciated by the Board in
Be-Lo Stores.8 9 In upholding the Board's finding of a violation of
§ 8(a)(1), the Court found that the employer's allowance of certain
solicitations did not meet the exception for "business related activi-
ties" or "isolated beneficent acts."
90
The Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hospital ("the Hospital") had
an official no-solicitation policy.91 Despite the policy, the Hospital al-
lowed certain groups to solicit within the Hospital.92 When a local
union attempted to gain access to the property for the purpose of or-
ganizing the Hospital's employees, their request was refused by the
Hospital's administration. 93 The Union filed a ULP against the Hos-
pital. The ALJ and the Board found that by permitting numerous
non-union solicitations, the Hospital had discriminated against the
union in its application of the policy.94
Upon review by the D.C. Circuit, the Hospital argued that the other
solicitations fell under the exception outlined in Be-Lo Stores relating
to business functions. The Court agreed with the ALJ and the Board
and found that these solicitations did not relate to the enhancement of
87. Id. at *15-16.
88. 97 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. It should be noted that the D.C. Court of Appeals has long been haled as being more
receptive to orders and decisions of the National Labor Relations Board than its counterparts in
the other circuits.
90. Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hosp., 97 F.3d at 590.
91. Id. at 586. In order to prevent disruption in the operation of the hospital, interference
with patient care, and inconvenience to our patients and their visitors, the following rules will
apply to solicitation and distribution of literature on hospital property. Outsiders: Persons not
employed by the hospital may not solicit or distribute literature on hospital property for any
purpose at any time .... Id.
92. The groups that set up tables for the purposes of soliciting hospital employees included a
credit union and a child daycare center. Id. The Hospital also, at times, authorized medical
textbook vendors to set up displays on the property, as well as a voluntary association of hospital
employees selling gifts, and the like. Id.
93. Id.
94. Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hosp., 97 F.3d at 586.
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health care nor the work environment. The services and products of-
fered by the nonunion solicitors were not intrinsic to the Hospital's
operations. 95 Since the solicitations were for purely commercial pur-
poses, the hospital could not defend its disparate application of the
no-solicitation policy on the grounds that these solicitations were
charitable in nature. 96
Three points are worth noting in the court's decision. First, no-
where within the opinion did the court differentiate between an em-
ployer's act of prohibiting union organizational solicitations as
opposed to banning protests. The Union's actions were organiza-
tional. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether the outcome
would have been different had the union's actions been for the pur-
poses of an economic protest.
Second, this decision was handed down before the Fourth Circuit
ignored the exceptions enunciated by the Board in Be-Lo Stores.
Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, the Hospital would not
have had to defend its disparate application of the policy on the
grounds that it fell into one of the two exceptions. The exceptions
would not have been at issue had the Fourth Circuit addressed the
disparate application.
Finally, unlike Riesbeck Food Markets, the D.C. Circuit did not ad-
dress the impact of disruption that might occur from certain solicita-
tions. Recall that in Riesbeck Food Markets, the 4th Circuit stated
that since charitable solicitations posed no threat of disruption to the
business, while union protests did, the employer was allowed to dis-
criminate in such a manner.97 The D.C. Circuit never discussed the
potential disruption to the hospital's operations that could occur.
5. Four B v. NLRB
In 1998, the Tenth Circuit muddied the waters regarding discrimina-
tory conduct of employers in barring certain solicitations.98 The gro-
cery store barred solicitation of "team members" within its stores. 99
95. Id. at 588.
96. Id. at 589.
97. See supra note 86.
98. Four B v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1998).
99. The non-solicitation policy stated as follows:
[Tihere must be no solicitation or distribution of literature of any kind by any team
member during the actual working time of the team member or soliciting or the team
member being solicited. Persons who are not Company team members may not solicit
or distribute literature for any purpose in any customer area, working area or any area
restricted to Company team members. There must be no solicitation or distribution of
literature of any kind by persons in customer service areas or shopping areas of the
store during those hours when the store is open for business.
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Union agents entered the grocery store and attempted to solicit the
company's employees in an organizational drive. Following their ejec-
tion by management, the agents began to solicit employees in the
parking lot and sidewalks surrounding the store during the employees'
non-working time. The grocery store had, in the past, allowed other
groups to solicit in the parking lot and sidewalks. Nonetheless, man-
agement again ejected the union agents from the property. 00
The ALJ found that the employer did not violate § 8(a)(1) when it
barred the union agents from the parking lot and sidewalk. The ALJ
based its decision on the fact that the employer had only allowed so-
licitations of its customers in the past, and not employees. Since the
union was soliciting employees and not customers, the ALJ reasoned
that the employer was legally entitled to ban such solicitations. 101
The NLRB rejected the ALJ's distinction of the employer's discrim-
ination based on audience. The Board held that a discriminatory mo-
tive could be inferred from the fact that the employer allowed non-
union solicitations in its parking lot, but barred union solicitations.
The Board found irrelevant the employer's argument that it was enti-
tled to bar the union agents since they were soliciting employees,
whereas the nonunion solicitors only approached customers. 0 2
The Tenth Circuit upheld the NLRB's finding. Section 8(a)(1) for-
bids employers from engaging in anti-union animus in attempting to
bar the organization of employees. The court found that when the
management of Four B removed the union agents from its parking lot
and sidewalks, it was motivated by anti-union animus. 10 3 The court
also stated that the ban fell outside the employer's written policy.
Management was entitled to bar the union agents from soliciting while
the employees were within the store. However, the employer was not
entitled to take such action once the employees left the premises.
10 4
Several points are noteworthy in the court's holding. First, the
Tenth Circuit never took issue with Four B's property right to exclude.
It is quite possible that the management of Four B could have es-
poused the argument that it had a vested right to exclude others from
its parking lot based on traditional notions of property law (i.e.,
trespass).
Id. at 1179.
100. Id. at 1181.
101. Id. at 1180.





Second, Four B argued that its policy of allowing non-union solici-
tors on the parking lot and sidewalks fell under the exception for "be-
neficent acts" stated first by the Board in Be-Lo, reiterated in Lucile
Salter Packard.10 5 Although the Court rejected the argument, it did
give consideration to the employer's position. In overturning the
Board's finding of a § 8(a)(1) violation in Be-Lo Stores, the Fourth
Circuit refused to give consideration to exceptions existing. Rather,
the Fourth Circuit stated that no violation occurs where the employer
disparately enforces a non-solicitation policy.10 6 One year after the
Fourth Circuit turned a blind eye to granting exceptions to employer
discrimination, the Tenth Circuit in line with the D.C. Circuit, implied
that certain exceptions do exist. This is a clear conflict between the
Circuits.
III. ANALYSIS
The Analysis section of the article will first address the necessity of
granting unions nonemployee access to employer property. Part B of
the Analysis will draw conclusions regarding the current debate be-
tween the NLRB and the courts, and between the courts themselves.
Part C of the Analysis will attempt to discern what the Supreme Court
truly meant by the word "discriminate. And finally, justifications will
be put forward for a narrowed tailoring of the Supreme Court's excep-
tion for "discrimination".
A. Do The Unions Need This Access?
1. Union Organizational Efforts
A common argument made by unions in lobbying the courts to al-
low nonemployees to have access to employer property is that such
access is a prerequisite to successful organizing campaigns. 10 7 One of
the clear purposes of the NLRA, argue unions, was to allow employ-
ees the right to organize so as to bargain collectively.10 8 Thus, unions
argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere represents a
105. See Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hosp. v. NLRB, 97 F.3d 583, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
see also Be-Lo Stores, 318 N.L.R.B. 1 (1995).
106. Be-Lo Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268, 278 (4th Cir. 1997).
107. Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB - A Time to Reexamine
the Rule of Babcock and Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 66 (1994). Zmija argues,
"[u]nion organizing activity performed by employees is important, but it pales in comparison to
efforts conducted by professional nonemployees." Id.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). "The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce ..... Id.
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clear roadblock to the effectuation of Congress' intent in formulating
the NLRA: to empower employees with the right to organize. This
intent is clearly set out in § 1 of the NLRA. 10 9 However, Congress
does not state in the NLRA whether nonemployees may engage in
organizing activity so as to meet the Act's purpose. The NLRA limits
this right to "employees"." t0
Do unions have an argument that the involvement of nonemployees
in organizing activities is essential for fulfilling the purpose of the
NLRA? Unions will cite the declining nature of organized labor as
testimony to their argument that Lechmere doesn't allow for the
NLRA's purpose to be realized. Unions will argue that their numbers
have decreased partly because union officials, as a result of Lechmere,
do not have access to employees so as to appeal to them."'
Unions have witnessed a general decline in membership since 1983.
In 1983, the percentage of unionized members among the workforce
was 20.1%. In the year 2000, this number was 13.5%.'12 Although the
decrease is substantial, these percentages fail to reflect the fact that
union membership has rebounded slightly in the past several years. In
the year 1999 alone, union membership increased by more than
265,000 workers. This increase represented the largest increase in
more than two decades. Within this increase, private sector member-
ship increased by over 112,000 - nearly double what the previous
highest increase had been in the last twenty years." 3 The previous
year, 1998, saw almost the exact increases in membership.' 4 The year
2000 did see a slight decrease in the number of unionized members,
from 16.48 million to 16.3 million.11 5 Nonetheless, unionization has
been up since 1998.
Membership statistics are pertinent to our analysis because unions
may argue that their numbers have been down as a result of the
109. Id.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). The NLRA defines 'employee' as such: "The term 'employee'
shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise ... ." Id.
1 I. Zmija, supra note 107, at 70.
112. United States Department of Labor -Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Sum-
mary (2000), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2002) (These figures do comprise both public sector and private sector unionization. When the
two groups are split, public sector membership rates are substantially higher - 37.5% within the
public sector as compared to 9.0% in the private sector).
I 3. AFL-CIO, available at http://www.aflcio.org/publ/press2000/pr019.htm (last visited Feb.
6, 2002).
114. AFL-CIO, available at http://www.aflcio.org/publ/pressl999/pr061 I.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2002).
115. See supra note 112.
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Court's holding in Lechmere. However, perhaps more pertinent to
the effect of Lechmere on unions is the increased commitment unions
have made to their organizing efforts. Between 1995 and 1999, the
American labor movement's total budgetary allocation made to orga-
nizational resources doubled. 116 In the year 2000, the AFL-CIO
trained more than 2000 people to work solely on organizational cam-
paigns - this number represents a third more than it trained in 1999.117
Unions may argue that these increases are a direct result of their
need to find alternative means of accessing employees for the pur-
poses of organizing. In looking at the numbers of increases in mem-
bership over this period, the argument could be made that these
increases in budgetary allocations have had an effect on membership.
Yet, it is extremely hard to overlook the impact the overall state of
our nation's economy has upon unionization. Where increases in pro-
duction in the manufacturing and building sectors occur, union mem-
bership increases will occur. Manufacturing and general building
production numbers were up for the time period that unions saw in-
creases during the late 1990s.11 8 Thus, it is hard to estimate what im-
pact the increases in organizational budgets throughout the labor
movement had upon membership numbers.
As stated, union membership numbers have been declining since
1983. This seems to belie the argument made by unions that a large
percentage of the decrease in their numbers can be attributed to their
inability to reach many employees as a result of Lechmere. If union
numbers were on the decline before Lechmere in 1992, can unions
honestly argue that Lechmere has aggravated these decreases? A
larger drop in union organization numbers would help the labor
movements' claims here. However, since these numbers have stead-
ied and organizational numbers were on the decline before Lechmere,
it appears that the labor movement's argument is refuted here.
2. Salting and Finding Other Ways to Reach the Workforce
In 1995, the Supreme Court addressed whether salting was a legal
tactic for unions to employ in organizational activities. Salting occurs
where a union sends one of its organizers into a business seeking em-
ployment. 119 Once employed, the organizer is entitled to § 7 rights
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Union membership numbers have, historically, been most highly correlated to the
general state of our economy. Where the economy is booming in the trade and manufacturing
sectors, membership numbers will be up, and vice versa.
119. Supra note 12.
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under the NLRA and may solicit employees.' 20 In Town & Coun-
try, 12 1 the Supreme Court found that it was a violation of § 8(a)(1) and
§ 8(a)(3)12 2 for an employer to refuse to hire or release from employ-
ment an employee on the basis that he or she is a paid union orga-
nizer. The Court found that in defining "employee" in the NLRA,
Congress intended a broad reading. The language of the Act was
"broad enough to include those company workers whom a union also
pays for organizing."' 123 Thus, employers were no longer able to dis-
criminate against union organizers in hiring or replacing such workers.
As a result of the decision, unions were granted the right to send
organizers into a workplace and seek employment. Once employed,
the organizer was entitled to § 7 rights and could solicit employees on
its own time 24 to join the union. According to the Court, salting was
a legal tactic.
Town & Country softened the blow unions sustained three years
earlier in Lechmere. Although union organizers could be prohibited
from an employer's property under Lechmere, they could not be pro-
hibited from gaining employment. Town & Country forbade dismis-
sals or refusals to hire based on union affiliation.
It is unknown whether the Court's holding in Town & Country has
had a significant impact on union organization. Yet, it is obvious that
the Court's decision in Town & Country can be viewed as supportive
of union membership, whereas Lechmere had the opposite effect.
In Lechmere, the Supreme Court suggested that unions, in the past,
have found success in organizing campaigns through advertising, as
well as "via mailings, phone calls, and home visits.' 25 The Court
stated, "direct contact, of course, is not a necessary element of 'rea-
120. Id.
121. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) (1988). Section 8(a)(3) provides in relevant part: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ..... Id.
123. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 90.
124. See supra notes 42-43. Recall that in Republic Aviation, the Supreme Court stated that
employees, in the exercise of their § 7 rights, may not be prohibited by an employer from solicit-
ing other employees for organizational purposes, so long as the employees' activity is done oil
their own time. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
125. The Court noted that the union organizers prior to trespassing on the employer's prop-
erty recorded the license plates of the employees' cars and then with the assistance of the local
Department of Motor Vehicles received the employees' names. Leclhiere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502
U.S. 527, 530 (1992). The union then sent these employees information pertaining to its labor




sonably effective' communication." 126 These statements suggest that
the Court believes the labor movement can be successful in organizing
campaigns without being given non-employee access. "Access to em-
ployees, not success in winning them over, is the critical issue."'1 27 So
long as unions have a point of access to employees, they have the abil-
ity to win them over. This point, combined with the Court's holding in
Town & Country, provide a strong argument that unions retain suffi-
cient channels of communication to send their message to employees.
Recall that in Cleveland Real Estate Partners, the Sixth Circuit
stated that no labor movement policy would be advanced by allowing
union activities to occur based on the notion that the employer shop-
ping mall was discriminating by allowing other solicitations. 128 In this
statement, the Sixth Circuit rejects the notion that the purpose of the
NLRA is impeded where non-employee, union organizers are refused
access. The court's statement shows a reluctance to read into the
NLRA that the rights of an "employee" include the right to be solic-
ited by union organizers where these organizers are not employed. If
other courts adopt this policy, unions' arguments for access based on
the effectuation of the NLRA's purpose will not go far.
B. Summary Of The Broad Guidelines In Current Law
The current state of the law regarding nonemployee access is a
"conflicting and an unworkable set of rules."' 129 The existing caselaw
is illustrative of the confusion that exists. 130 Employers are not sure of
their right to exclude because the Supreme Court has yet to define
what amounts to discrimination and a violation of § 8(a)(1) in exclud-
ing nonemployee union organizers/protesters. Unions, likewise, are
not sure when they may be able to protest or organize in the face of an
employer's ban on solicitation. Some broad conclusions may be
drawn, however.
First, in order to enforce a no solicitation policy against unions, the
policy must have been put in place before the union begins its activi-
ties. "When faced with a union organizing campaign an employer may
not for union reasons promulgate a no-solicitation and/or no-distribu-
tion rule."1 31 To do so, would clearly be a violation of § 8(a)(1).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996).
129. Zmija, supra note 107, at 70.
130. See supra Part II.
131. 1-5 Nat'l Lab. Rel. Act: Law & Prac. (MB) § 5.05 (2002).
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Second, if an employer has a no solicitation policy in place and is
not allowing solicitations by any group (whether related to the union,
or charitable in nature), nonemployee, union organizers will have no
basis for claiming a violation of § 8(a)(1).132 If the employer has a
vested property interest, it has the right to exclude others. Recalling
Sears, Roebuck, 133 an employer may rely on state trespass laws to ex-
clude others from its property where the employer is not challenging
the legality of a protest. Where an employer enforces a no-solicitation
policy even-handily, unions have no remedy.
Lechmere posits that non-employee union organizers may claim
that they are entitled to access where no reasonable alternative means
of access exist.134 The union has the burden of showing such. Lech-
mere places great restrictions on where a union will be successful in
such a showing. 135 Existing case law gives no examples of where a
union has been successful in arguing that access must be granted
based on the fact that no alternative means of communication exist.
C. What Did The Supreme Court Truly Mean By "Discriminate"?
In Lechmere, the Supreme Court reiterated the stance taken in
Babcock that a union must be given access to an employer's property
if the "employer's access rules discriminate against union solicita-
tion." 36 What the Court meant by 'discriminate' is the crux of the
issue. As discussed, the NLRB and the Federal Circuits have hotly
debated this issue.
The Supreme Court failed to define what it meant by 'discriminate'
by not citing instances where access must be granted. It left the deci-
sion of what amounts to discrimination to the NLRB and the lower
courts. These bodies have struggled to bring consistency to the term.
Did the Supreme Court mean that an employer only discriminates
when it allows another union to solicit to the exclusion of another, or
132. See supra note 67. Unless, the union can make a claim that no alternative means of
communication exist so as to convey their message to employees, and in the absence of discrimi-
nation, they have no claim that § 8(a)(1) has been violated. Recall Lechmere: where employees
are situated in a secluded setting (i.e., logging and mining camps), employers may be forced to
grant non-employee union organizers access. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
133. See supra note 35.
134. See supra note 67.
135. Id. By stating that alternative means of communication do not exist in situations where
employees are secluded (i.e., logging camps, mountain resort hotels), the Court in Lechmere
indicated that alternative means of communication do exist where employees are not secluded.
Thus, where an employer bans solicitation and the union has the ability to gain access to them
off company premises, unions have no argument based on this exception.
136. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978)).
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did the Court intend for a broader reading of 'discriminate' so as to
encompass instances where an employer allows charitable solicitations
on its property while excluding union solicitations?
1. Picking One Union Over Another
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other sup-
port to it. '' 137 The purpose of this Section was to outlaw the formation
of "company unions."'1 38 However, Congress also contemplated "sub-
tle, but conscious economic pressure. 1 39 A case could obviously be
made that an employer violates § 8(a)(2) when it allows one union to
solicit information on its property in the face of a solicitation ban
while excluding other unions from doing so.
The Supreme Court would have cleared up all the confusion by stat-
ing that this scenario was what it had in mind when it made the dis-
crimination exception in Babcock. The NLRB has yet to hear a
§ 8(a)(2) in the context of a union claim for access. Nonetheless, re-
call that the Sixth Circuit in Cleveland Real Estate Partners stated that
this was what the Supreme Court meant by discrimination. 140
However, unions, and possibly the NLRB, will make the case that
such a narrow reading of 'discriminate' is inconsistent with what the
Court meant. Unions could possibly argue that since the Court never
mentioned § 8(a)(2) in its discussion of discrimination in Babcock or
Lechmere, the Supreme Court didn't intend this narrow reading. Un-
ions may state that had the Supreme Court intended to narrow the
discrimination exception to instances where an employer allows one
union to solicit to the exclusion of the other, the Court would have
addressed whether such 'assistance' amounts to both discrimination,
and a violation of § 8(a)(1), as well as a violation of § 8(a)(2). On the
other hand, did the Court intend to prevent charitable organizations
from soliciting through a broad reading of 'discriminate'?
137. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). It is important to note that before a finding of a violation
of §8(a)(2) may be found, a finding of a labor organization must be found. "Under the statutory
definition set forth in Section 2(5), the organization at issue is a labor organization if (1) employ-
ees participate, (2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of 'dealing with'
employers, and (3) these dealings concern 'conditions of work' or concern other statutory sub-
jects, such as grievances, labor disputes, wages rates of pay, or hours of employment. Further, if
the organization has as a purpose the representation of employees, it meets the statutory defini-
tion .... Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (1994).
138. S. REP. No. 573, at 9-11 (1935), reprinted in ARCHIBALD COX, ET AL., LABOR LAW 196
(2000).
139. Id.
140. See supra note 82.
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2. What are "Isolated Beneficent Acts"?
Recall that in Be-Lo Stores, the NLRB carved exceptions to its
stance that an employer's discrimination of union activities amounts
to a violation of § 8(a)(1). One of these exceptions was for "isolated
beneficent acts."' 4' Although some Circuits have rejected the excep-
tions arguing that when an employer allows charitable solicitations it
is not discriminating, 42 other Courts have given consideration to such
exceptions 43 existing for an employer's discrimination against a
union. Although the Circuits that have favored such consideration
have rejected the employer's acts as fitting the exceptions, their will-
ingness conflicts with other circuits.
When the Supreme Court in Babcock stated that an employer must
grant a union access to its property if it is discriminating in its non-
solicitation policy, it did not state that exceptions to this rule exist.
Thus, why does the Board carve such exceptions in Be-Lo Stores?
The Board in Be-Lo Stores clearly misinterpreted Babcock and
Lechmere. There clearly are two possible interpretations of Babcock
and Lechmere: 1) The Court believed that an employer could not dis-
criminate between a union and other groups such as charitable organi-
zations in enforcing solicitation policies; or 2) The Court believed
'discriminate' was confined to instances where an employer allows one
union to solicit to the exclusion of another. Under the second inter-
pretation, charitable organizations don't fit the word 'discriminate'.
Allowing for "isolated beneficent acts" is discriminating! It was
clearly hypocritical for the Board in Be-Lo Stores to state that an em-
ployer may discriminate sometimes in 'isolated' instances, but it may
not discriminate all the time. How can the Board say that some 'iso-
lated' beneficent acts may be allowed in the face of a no-solicitation
policy, but others may not? Such a precedent provides no bright line
rules for employers and unions to follow. The Board should have
stated all beneficent acts, or no beneficent acts may be allowed.
Courts that have followed the Board's precedent are simply confusing
what 'discriminate' means. Would it be legal for an employer to dis-
criminate in the hiring of minority applicants sometimes, but not all
the time?
141. See supra note 72.
142. See Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 1996).
143. See Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hosp. v. NLRB, 97 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see
also Four B v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1998).
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The NLRB's holding in Be-Lo Stores confuses employers and un-
ions alike. Neither party has clear guidance under this reasoning as to
when an employer has committed a § 8(a)(1) violation.
D. An Employer Has A Right To Exclude
Sears, Roebuck held that an employer's action of ejecting union
protesters from its premises falls under state trespass law, and the
NLRA does not preempt such law so as to enable unions to protest on
an employer's premises, free and clear of any trespass law.144 "Sears
provides an indication that private property rights, while not absolute,
will generally be afforded more protection than § 7 rights."'1 45 Does a
right to exclude mean that an employer may exclude one group while
refraining from excluding another?
When the union attempts to engage in such activities on company
premises, the employer has the right to eject them based on state tres-
pass law. Hypothetically, if the Supreme Court were to find that an
employer has violated the NLRA when it ejects union protesters
while allowing for charitable solicitations, an employer's ability to de-
fer to state trespass law would be undercut. Such a holding by the
Supreme Court could also be viewed as overturning Sears, Roebuck.
The Court, in such a finding, would implicitly be holding that § 7
rights trump private property rights.
E. An Employer Has The Right To Run The Business
Although charitable solicitations have the potential to disrupt the
flow of business activity, they do not pose nearly the threat of union
activities. A union's activities, whether they are organizational in na-
ture or for the purpose of protest, have the potential to disrupt the
business of the employer who is being targeted. 146 Often a union's
purpose in conducting protest activities is to undercut the business'
patronage. This disruption threatens a business' viability. Unions will
often engage in these protest activities through the use of billboards
and holding pickets off company premises. Such activities have less
potential for disrupting the business since their message is usually con-
144. See supra note 35.
145. Michael L. Stevens, The Conflict Between Union Access and Private Property Rights:
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1327 (1992).
146. Often disrupting the course of the employer's business is the focus of protest activities.
For instance, in Cleveland Real Estate Partners, the union protesters clearly were engaged in the
activity intending to draw business away from the employer who was hiring non-union
employees.
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veyed away from the employer's premises. These activities may be
just as effective as activities on the employer's premises.
Recall that in Riesbeck Food Markets, the Fourth Circuit recognized
that certain union activities, namely protest activities, have the poten-
tial of undermining the business purposes of the employer. 147 This
recognition shows that courts may be willing to delineate between the
harmful effects union protests can cause business interests and the
neutral position of charitable groups. This justification in Riesbeck is
one basis the Supreme Court should use in narrowing the discrimina-
tion exception.
An employer retains entrepreneurial rights in operating the busi-
ness. The Supreme Court implicitly recognized such a right in Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,148 in finding that it
was within the employer's discretion to close a business based on anti-
union animus. The most fundamental entrepreneurial right of a busi-
ness is the decision whether to be in business in the first place. 149 Such
entrepreneurial rights will often come in conflict with the effectuation
of § 7 rights. Thus, finding a balance between an employer's en-
trepreneurial rights and § 7 rights is not an easy task.
Another point that must not be forgotten is the overarching pur-
pose of the NLRA. Congress enacted the NLRA to improve our na-
tion's capitalist structure and remove burdens placed on the flow of
commerce by labor disputes. 50 When Congress enacted the NLRA, a
major reason for doing so was to alleviate the burdens placed on com-
merce by disputes between employees and management. 151 Where
nonemployees disrupt business through protest and organizational ac-
147. Riesbeck Food Mkts. v. NLRB, Nos. 95-1766, 95-1917, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 17693, at
*13 (4th Cir. 1996).
An employer must have some degree of control over messages it conveys to its custom-
ers on its private property ... Riesbeck has a strong interest in preventing the use of its
property for conduct which directly undermines its purposes, i.e., the sale of goods and
services to Riesbeck's customers, which was implicated by the union's solicitations but
not by the charitable solicitations.
Id.
148. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
149. Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyber-
space: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organiza-
tions, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening
or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in commerce through
strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair
the interest of the public in the free flow of commerce. The elimination of such prac-
tices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.




tivities on employer property, capitalism and the flow of commerce
have the potential to be disrupted.
As stated, unions may argue that Lechmere bas the effectuation of
§ 7 rights. 152 However, employers may counter this argument by de-
ferring to the real purpose of the NLRA. Where labor protests and
organizing drives interrupt the operation of business, the Act's clear
aim of improving capitalism is not realized.
F. Can The Unions Survive Lechmere?
Protecting an employer's property rights and the capitalist system
are strong arguments in favor of allowing employers to discriminate
against nonemployee union organizers. Unions have strong argu-
ments premised on § 7. So it is inevitable that the protection of em-
ployers' property rights and entrepreneurial rights, and the protection
of § 7 rights cannot always coexist in this context. Although unions
may not so easily concede so, they do have the ability to reach em-
ployees for the purpose of organizing, and reaching the general public
for the purpose of protesting without being granted nonemployee ac-
cess. In this way, § 7 rights may still be given cover while protecting
the free flow of commerce and property rights.
As stated, the Supreme Court's ruling in Town & Country softened
the blow that unions sustained in Lechmere. It may seem oxymoronic
to prevent an employer from discriminating in refusing to employ
union organizers, while allowing employers to discriminate against
such organizers in having access to employer property for organizing.
However, one basis for such a distinction may be the wealth of laws
barring discrimination in the context of an employer's hiring deci-
sions.1 53 Clearly, it would have been hypocritical for the Court to al-
low employers to discriminate against union organizers while
preventing such discrimination on the basis of other categories.1 54
The Supreme Court may be implying that a tradeoff is in order. An
argument can be made that the Supreme Court will allow an employer
to retain vested property rights based on state trespass law in ex-
change for barring discrimination in hiring practices.
152. See supra Part III.A.
153. Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to fail or refuse to hire any individual because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (2001). The American Disability Act (ADA) prevents an employer
from discriminating on the basis of a disability. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 (2001).
154. Id.
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Town & Country represents a clear victory for unions. Employers
may not inquire into a prospective employee's union affiliations in
making hiring decisions. An employee with union affiliations may
come into a work setting and solicit employees during non-working
time. 55 Such a scenario gives a union direct access to employees.
A union's ability to organize a workforce does not cease at the
point of an employer's policy of no solicitation. Several alternative
channels of communication exist. The access discussed in Town &
Country represents just one avenue. Unions may also utilize newspa-
pers, telephone and home solicitations. 56 Another avenue exists
where unions find ways to discuss organizing drives with a small num-
ber of employees, attempting to spur a larger drive through this small
group.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unions can survive without the access posited in Lechmere. Unions
point to their general decreases in membership and the notion that § 7
rights are constrained by the Court's holdings in Babcock & Wilcox
and Lechmere in arguing that employers may not discriminate against
their solicitations while allowing charitable solicitations. Unions be-
lieve that the discrimination exception first enunciated in Babcock &
Wilcox' 57 forbids an employer from allowing other groups to solicit on
their property while excluding unions. However, employers have sev-
eral arguments to refute the labor movement's claims.
First, if the Supreme Court intended to bar an employer from al-
lowing charitable solicitations while it also excluded unions why didn't
it say so in Lechmere? The Court had a chance to clear the air ema-
nating from Jean Country. 5 8 Instead of deferring to the balancing test
set forth by the NLRB in Jean Country,159 the Court stated that such a
test conflicts with its holding in Babcock & Wilcox. Since the Court
never stated exactly what it meant by discrimination in Lechmere, it is
argued here that the Supreme Court should revisit the issue. Second,
an employer's rights to exclude based on state trespass laws and the
Court's holding in Sears, Roebuck 60 suggest that an employer may
eject unions from its employer's property without interfering with § 7
155. See supra note 43. Non-working time is equivalent to one's time spent while not
working.
156. See supra note 124. Although the union in Lechmere was unsuccessful in organizing the
workforce through such tactics, their failure is not dispositive of all union attempts.
157. See supra note 13.
158. See supra note 58.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 32-35.
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rights. Third, the idea that the flow of business and commerce have
the potential to be interrupted by union activity on employer premises
favor the ability of employers to prohibit unions from soliciting. This
argument is partially based on the purpose of the NLRA. 161 Fourth,
Unions may point to their decreases in membership as a reason to
disallow an employer's discrimination. Although, union membership
numbers have declined in recent decades, it is hard for unions to argue
that Lechmere was the impetus for such decreases. Fifth, the Sixth
Circuit's deference to the furtherance of labor policies in Cleveland
Real Estate Partners is persuasive for allowing employers to discrimi-
nate against unions. The Court stated "no relevant labor policies are
advanced by requiring employers to prohibit charitable solicitations in
order to preserve the right to exclude nonemployee distribution of
union literature."1 62 This is given support by the final argument for
allowing an employer to discriminate: Unions still have access to em-
ployees. The Court's holding in Town & Country allowing for salting
and the alternative means of communication posited in Lechmere sup-
port the proposition that unions are still viable in organizing a
workforce.
For the foregoing reasons, it is argued that the Supreme Court
should revisit its holdings in Lechmere and Babcock & Wilcox. The
Court should grant certiorari in the next case addressing the issue.
The Court's holding should explicitly state that an employer may eject
union solicitations while allowing for other groups to solicit, including,
but not limited to charitable groups. The Court should explicitly state
that 'to discriminate', in this context amounts to favoring one union
over another, and thus amounts to a violation of § 8(a)(2).163 As rea-
soning for such a holding, the Court should find persuasive an em-
ployer's vested property rights, its entrepreneurial control, as well as
the vast array of alternative channels of communication available to
unions.
161. See supra note 149.
162. See Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 1996).
163. See supra note 136.
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